Cuz We Said So

One year after the President's 2003 State of the Union address - and seven months before the 2004 Presidential election - much is being made of "intelligence failures" and "misrepresentations" of the Bush administration as it made its case for war.

Many things were said by many members of the Bush administration regarding the threat that Saddam posed prior to the invasion in the spring of 2003. Even as far back as 1998, Bill Clinton made a speech before the Pentagon that is almost a point-for-point replica of the Bush case for war - complete with Saddam's links to international terrorists.

I cannot possibly analyze every statement made over a 5 year period by every general and politican in office regarding the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. So let's look at the justification for war as laid out by the President himself on the eve of war, in his words. If we analyze the 2003 State of the Union Address as the official case for war, with the benefit of one year's worth of hindsight, exactly how flawed was the case Bush made?

Bush made 15 points outlining his case for war. Below is each point, and my analysis.

[Point 1] Almost three months ago, the United Nations Security Council gave Saddam Hussein his final chance to disarm. He has shown instead utter contempt for the United Nations, and for the opinion of the world. The 108 U.N. inspectors were sent to conduct -- were not sent to conduct a scavenger hunt for hidden materials across a country the size of California. The job of the inspectors is to verify that Iraq's regime is disarming. It is up to Iraq to show exactly where it is hiding its banned weapons, lay those weapons out for the world to see, and destroy them as directed. Nothing like this has happened.

[Point 2] The United Nations concluded in 1999 that Saddam Hussein had biological weapons sufficient to produce over 25,000 liters of anthrax -- enough doses to kill several million people. He hasn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it.

[Point 3] The United Nations concluded that Saddam Hussein had materials sufficient to produce more than 38,000 liters of botulinum toxin -- enough to subject millions of people to death by respiratory failure. He hadn't accounted for that material. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed it.

[Point 4] Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. In such quantities, these chemical agents could also kill untold thousands. He's not accounted for these materials. He has given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

* In David Kay's testimony to Congress, Kay stated that while he doubted that any actual weapons would be found, that it was clear that Iraq maintained the means to produce such weapons, and in many cases, could have resumed production in a matter of days. Therefore, the "WMD" statements from this State of the Union address, while unprovable to date, are somewhat disputed, and yet somewhat affirmed by David Kay.

[Point 5] U.S. intelligence indicates that Saddam Hussein had upwards of 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical agents. Inspectors recently turned up 16 of them -- despite Iraq's recent declaration denying their existence. Saddam Hussein has not accounted for the remaining 29,984 of these prohibited munitions. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

Clearly, since Saddam had 16 of these weapons, their entire existence wasn't a chimera. Let's suppose that we overestimated the number of munitions he had by 99%. That would still mean he had 300 such munitions, of which he only accounted for 16 - still an egregious violation of 687 and 1441. I'm not sure about the accuracy of the 30,000 figure, but I would be shocked if only 16 were actually built, and luckily we managed to find them all. The veracity of this statement comes down to "what was the real number built" and "how many constitutes a reasonable justification for war".

[Point 6] From three Iraqi defectors we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs. These are designed to produce germ warfare agents, and can be moved from place to a place to evade inspectors. Saddam Hussein has not disclosed these facilities. He's given no evidence that he has destroyed them.

If these were not bioweapons labs, then the failure was:
- one part intel failure (the "labs" were not dual-use)
- one part deception or misinformation from defectors
- one part failure of Saddam to simply allow inspectors to view these facilities

Hindsight is 20/20. At the time, all available intel - coupled with Saddam's refusal to disclose these labs - left us with only the conclusion that they were in fact mobile bioweapons labs.

In other words, we would have had to go to war to find out that they were not dangerous.

Now the most fascinating part: they might have been dual-use bioweapons labs after all. According to the Iraq Survey Group, "an Iraqi artillery officer says they never used these types of systems and that the hydrogen for artillery units came in canisters from a fixed production facility." And I just can't get over the fact that, if they were harmless, why weren't they disclosed.

[Point 7] The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb.

[Point 8] The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.

I think common sense would demonstrate that, based on the Kay report, Saddam was at least seeking to procure uranium, even if the intelligence in 2003 was flawed.

[Point 9] Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide.

[Point 10] The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary; he is deceiving. From intelligence sources we know, for instance, that thousands of Iraqi security personnel are at work hiding documents and materials from the U.N. inspectors, sanitizing inspection sites and monitoring the inspectors themselves. Iraqi officials accompany the inspectors in order to intimidate witnesses.

[Point 11] Iraq is blocking U-2 surveillance flights requested by the United Nations.

[Point 12] Iraqi intelligence officers are posing as the scientists inspectors are supposed to interview.

[Point 13] Real scientists have been coached by Iraqi officials on what to say.

[Point 14] Intelligence sources indicate that Saddam Hussein has ordered that scientists who cooperate with U.N. inspectors in disarming Iraq will be killed, along with their families.

[Point 15] With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region. And this Congress and the America people must recognize another threat. Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.

Shortly before the war it was confirmed that Abu Nidal had been in hiding in Iraq. Since the war, other terrorist masterminds such as Abu Abbas (Achilles Lauro) and Khala Khadar al Salahat (Pan American Flight 103) were found harboring in Iraq.

Other examples include Ramzi Yousef (1993 WTC bomber) who was an Iraqi who came to the US on an Iraqi passport, and his chemist, Abdul Rahman Yasin, who fled to Baghdad after the bombing and lived there for years.

Of the 15 points used to justify the war: nine stand unquestioned, four (the statements on Iraq's capacity to produce bio/chem weapons and failure to disclose; and the statement on the state of "30,000" artillery shells designed for bio/chem weapon use) may contain factual inaccuracies but may nevertheless be correct in essence, one (the mobile bioweapons labs) has been placed in doubt but only because we conducted the war, and one (the British claim of attempted uranium purchases) is questionable but hardly unlikely.

Much hooey has also been made about the "imminence" of an attack from Iraq - or the lack thereof. I would refer readers to the next point in the Bush speech, not a data point, but a key to understanding the official justification for war:

[Point 16] Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and suddenly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.

Key Issues:

Issue 1: The Big Picture
The rationale of the Bush case for war was, generally speaking, "Saddam's a bad guy, he has the ability to make dangerous weapons, we know he sponsors terrorists, and we can't afford to wait until he manages to conduct an attack." When viewed this way, the facts on the ground in Iraq support this argument.

Issue 2: The Factual Claims
Did Bush claim that Saddam had actual WMD, or did Bush say that Saddam had failed to account for materials and programs which could produce WMD? The clear answer is that, if we are to go by the most official statements from Bush himself, the justification for war was based on Iraq's capacity to build WMD and failure to disclose and / or dismantle this capacity, not any statements that there were actual stockpiles of weaponized bio / chem agents ready for use.

Issue 3: Stockpiles: the Red Herring
Since the war we have also learned that Iraq intensified its efforts to quickly surge production of biological and chemical weapons. In other words, Iraq may not have needed to stockpile weapons since it was developing the capacity to rapidly produce them in large quantity. So the fact that no stockpiles of WMD have been found will likely turn out to be a red herring.

Issue 4: Missiles - The Untold Story
David Kay has demonstrated that Iraq had plans and programs in place to create a 1000 km missile, and - according to him - would have done so had Operation Iraqi Freedom not occurred. This was presented by Colin Powell in the UN but not stated to the American public in the State of the Union address. Moreover the Iraq Survey Group has also confirmed that Iraq was in negotiations with North Korea to acquire some of that nation's long-range missile technology. So we underestimated Saddam's missile capability.

Issue 5: Nukes
According to David Kay, Iraq was further along in its development of nuclear weapons than was previously thought, and was certainly attempting to acquire fissile material, though it had not done so. Clearly, if Saddam had been able to acquire a nuclear weapon, he would have immediately become virtually impossible to ever disarm. It is moreover likely that had Saddam developed a nuclear weapon, the entire Arabian world would have had to nuclearize as a deterrent. Waiting for Saddam to complete a nuclear weapon would have been thoroughly disastrous.

Issue 6: Deception and Trust
Possibly the most important issue is that - if in the worst case it turns out that the US, our allies, and the UN itself were absolutely 100% wrong about Iraq's WMD capability - we still ought to agree that prior to the war we could not know we were wrong. If in fact Saddam intentionally tried to create the illusion that he really did have prohibited systems like mobile bioweapons labs, unmanned aerial vehicles, long-range missle programs, and stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, even if he did not actually have any of them, still, how could we fail to act?